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This report waslfllt1flyundertakenOnthe SUPpOsjtjorxthat social scientists
occasionally had hintedat andsometimes hadformulated laws ofprinciples
suited to describeand explainthe Course ofgrowth (i.e., the rise,the
stationary condition,or the fall) ofsuch largecollectives (ortSOCial
organisms') as societies,
states, cultures,ana 'civilizations? it was
supposed that an assayo.f the literaturewould
times reveal logicallytenable arid - -
ing the rise and/orfall of largerCollectives.
frequently suggestand some-
emp)racaLly testable principlesrespect-
A great deal ofseemingly
relevant historical,sociological, economic,political, and anthropological
material has beenexamined.Relatively moreattention has been givento
historical, sociological,and socioeconomicwritings than to othersbecause
the former have beenmore immediatelyconcerned with the subjectunder dis-
cussion.More attentionhas been given tothe works of Englishand American
writers than 'to thoseof contirital scholars.
In the courseofpreparing this report itbecame evident that theprin-
ciples being sought forin the literaturewere formulated with less frequency
than had beenanticipated, and then,as a rule, withasmaller amount ofpre-
CjS1Othan empirical testbilitycalls for.ln consequence theemphasis of
this reportwas shifted.Attention was given to thestatement of the problem
of growth and toa sunrintion of the principal theoriesof the process of
sOcioeconornjc growth thathad been outlined in the literatureexamined.
This report is divided intofour main parts.In Part 1 an attempt is
made to state in tentative,theoretical terms the problem ofgrowth as it is
Conceived here,in Part 11 consideration is given tothe magnitudes thatmay
be employed torepresent growth, and a point of departure issuggested,in
Fart Hi, whichconstitutes about three-fourths of this report,the thories48
of socio-tconomjcgrowth are classifiedunder nine heads,and each type of
theory is descibed.In Part IVconsideration is givento the possibility of
discovering satisfactorylaws ofeconomic growth.The works cited, together
dth occasionalSUpplementary matter,are indicated in the listof footnotee
appearing at the end ofthis report.
Ientatjv Statementof Problem
The past, present,and future state,or course, of growth ofa large socty
needs to be representedbyme operationally definablemagnitude or complex
of magnitudes.For the sake of brevitylet us call thismagnitude (or corn-
plex of magnitudes) Mand its incrementalrate of growth M'. 1tus then
define as risingor expanding any society characterizedby a positive' and
an increasing M; as stationary,any society with a zero M' anda constant M;
and as declining or contracting,any society with a negative M'and a diinin-
ishing .
If th1type of definition be accepted,it is eseential that various
short-period movements (e.g., seasonal,cyclical, irregular) be eliminated
from the index of M employedso that this index represents the long-run trend
ordriftof the society.Analyses of the how and the why of the long-run
driftmay take the short-period movements intoaccount in so far as they
exercise a determinable influenceupon the long-run trend.
Selection of some magnitude toserve as index of a societyts course of
growth does not imply that the referent of thisindex is that society's
primum mobile,The very nature of social reality precludes this implication,
since the various iso].atablesources of movement in a society, even though
marked by some eatonomy and some novelty-creating power, are interdependent,
and interdependent in sucha we7 be the possibility of unchanging- 49 -
lead-laginterr'elationships,In fact themagnitude employed will almost
inevitably be a variablemuch more dependentthan independent, yet suited to
facilitate the discoveryand analysis of theways in ikiich sources of move-
ment or change affect!and U'.
Time may be importantand space is importantbecause change inmagnitude
takes place in theinb of time andspace.Since time is accessible to all
societies, it may be neglectedunless the object ofstudy is the rate of
change per period of time.The sj:ace aspect of changein magnitude is always
important, however, because ofthe limitations spece helps to imposeeither
upon the rate and volume of growth (i.e., U'and), or upon the direction
of growth, or upon all, theseaspects of growth.
Account, may be taken of the spatial factorthrough the division of
growthinto two types, the vertical, and thelateral,A magnitude grows by
ingesting and digesting its environmentand transmuting this environment into
itself; it remains stationary when influxjust balances efflux; and it de-
clines vthen, because efflux exceeds influx, environmentabsorbs a part of the
magnitude residing in that environment.If a magnitude has no space into
which to spread, it can grow only by exploitingmore intensively its already
given environment and absorbing more of the content of that environment.
This type of accretion may be called vertical growth.If a magnitude can and
does spread through a greater and greater extensity of space and in thepro-
cess absorbs more and more of this expanding environment, Its growth may be
described as lateral in character.If a magnitude is irreasing in both
manners its growth is vertical-lateral In form.Similarly, negative growth
may be negatively-vertical., negatively-lateral, and negatively_vertical_la.
teral in natureIf the environment merely absorbs part of the magnitude,A
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the contraction is negatively vertical; if the magnitude is contracting
because the space accessible to it is shrinking, the contraction is
negatively lateral; if the magnitude is beingsorbed by its environment
in both respects, the contraction is negatively verticallateral.
In practice the distinction between vertical and lateral, though highly
significant, is somewhat blurred.Societies may differ greatly respecting
both the amount of the space under their sovereignty and the amunt of
essentially empty (for the purposes of our discussion) space that is readily
susceptible of being brought under their control.Again a society to which
space limitation makes only vertical growthaccessible may slightly offset
its lack of opportunity for lateral expansion by importing materialsfrom
other environments and incorporating them into the magnituderegistering
this society's vertical growth.Yet again, although vertical growth does not
necessarily irnpiy lateral growth, lateral gro'i'dth usually presupposesvertical
growth; ireover, xgativel.y lateral contractionapparently tends to issue
out of negatively vertical contraction.
In one respect at least lateral growthsontines must be distinguished
sharply from vertical growth.Lateral growth may be defined toconsist
either in (a) the expansion of a societyinto essentially unoccupied space,
or in (b) the seizure by onesociety of a portion of anothersociety's space
arpopulation.Growth under condition(a) will not entail an increase in
growthchecking heterogeneity that issubstantially different in natureand
amount from that which accompaniesvertical growth.Under condition (b),
however, lateral expansion isaccompanied by considerablegrowthchecking
heterogeneity, at least untilsuch time as theseized population is cultur-
ally integrated into that of thesociety doing theseizing.- 51 -
Certain assumptionsmay be maderespecting the growthdeterminants of a
society.While it may bepostul that a societyusually is inert and
indisposed to expand, itis muchmore in accordance withreality to suppose
that a society normallytends to grow byabsorbing its envirornentuntil
obstacles arise toprevent further growthand perhaps even to bringabout
contraction.It is convenientand Compatible withreality to suppose that
the determinants ofa society's growth are bothinternal and external to
that society.
IITentative Point of Departure
Inasmuch as scholars havediffered respecting themagnitudes they have
selected to represent growth,we are free to select a magnitude toserve as
a point. of departure in centering thepresent discussion upon economic and
related aspects of growth.Let A stand for per capita netproduct of goods
and services; P for the uggregatepopulation composing a society; and for
the aggregate net product of thatsociety.Let t, and A'? + rep-.
resent, resnectively, the incremental ratesof growth of ,, and .Of
the magnitudes possibly atited for thepresent discussion, A and seem to
be the most satisfactory in thatone or the other or both will be sensitive
to and reflect many if not aU of the changes takingplace in the society.
Accordingly, it may usually be supposed thata society is rising, stationary,
or declining according as' and 4 are positive, zero, or negative.
(It is assumed,as stated earlier, that short-period movements have been
eliminated from our indices.)The significance in terms of social process of
changes in these incremental values is not determinable until the changes
have been 'casually' linked with antecedent changes an:1 events.It is con-
ceivable that such a determination may revealor still to be increasing- 52
even though in other parts of theSociety therealready are underwayprocess-
es that will bring about a cthninutjoninor A?.
It should be notedParenthetically thatA is not in itselfan adecpiate
measure of niafls material welfare.A is not adjusted for themanner in whih
total net product isditributecI, or forthe amount of leisureper capita
that is available jointly withIfis adjusted forthese tim oircwm-
stances it constitutesa reasonably adequatemeasure of mants material wel-
fare. Moreover, if theseand other circumstancesare held constant, the
movement ofserves as a reasonablyaccurate measure of the change in mants
material welfare ,1
The level of per capita netproduct (i.e., &) inany particular society
has many determinants,None of these determinants iscompletely independent.
On the contrary, each isconnected, usually in amanner involving mutual
interdependence, with a greateror lesser number of the remaining determi-
nants.While these determinants are interrelatedand not always physically
separable one from another, theyare anaiytically distinguishable.Working
lists of the determinants of the levelof per capita net product therefore
may be prepared.While such lists may differ in organization, theymay not
differ in aggregate content, if theyare to prove equally useful to the
analyst.The use of such a list is essential, moreover, to the study ofthe
growth of per capita net product, since otherwise the effects ofsome of the
determinants may be overlooked.
There follows a wDrking list of twenty determinants of the level ofper
capita net product, nineteen ofiich are specifically identified and one of
which does duty asa residual category within which may be placed product,-




1Age composition of thepopulation;
2Biological compositionof thepopulation;
3Health composition ofthe population;
4Material equipment (i.e.,resources, productive machinery,etc.) per worker;
5State of the industrialarts;
6'tate of the educational,scientific, and relatedcultural equipment of thepopulation;
7M-uizc..-up of the prevailingvaluesystem:in particular, the values
c,f the 80c10-economjc leadersand the values vèiich significantlr
ict economic creativityand the disposition ofman to put forth
ec3nolnically productive effort'
8Doinnant character of thepolitico..economjsystem:is it free
enterprise, mixed, socialdemocratic,or totalitarian in character?;
9Efectivaness and stability of therules, institutions, and legal
ar.c.r crients designed to preserve economic, political,and civil
orci7
10Degree of cooperation and amity obtainingbetween the groups and
cia&ses composing the population;
U Degi-ee to which the population'spattern of consumption is adjusted
to :ts pattern of resourceequipnient;
12F2.ezih1lity of the institutional structure and physicalapparatus
of the economy;
13Relative aitiount of vertical and horizontal mobility characteristic
of the population;
J4Internal geographical distribution of economic activities;
15 Exchange relations obtaining between the economy under study and
other economies;
16Degree of specialization and division of labor in effect;
17Scale of economic organization and activity prevalent;
18 Relative amount of complete, partial, and disguised unemployment
present;
19Distribution of the power to make and execute entrepreneurial
decisions;
20Residual factors which, though nQt significant at present, may
be come significant.-54...
Each determinant must beo definedas to make itanalytically and
operationally distinguishablefrom theothers1Even so, eachdeterminant,
,then thus defined, will befound to berelated tosome other determinantor
determinants; and the wholegroup will bediscov'ed toconstitute a netwerk
of more or less interdependentelements.No one of theseelements will be
wici always to actas a prime mover thatinitiates change andcompels other
elements to adjust thereto,In theory, atleast, we mayconceive of each
determinant as behavingsometimes as an independentvariable that acts autono.-
mously ari imposesupon other elements theneed to undergo adjustiveor
adaptive change, and at othcrtimes as a dependentvariable that responds
adaptively topressure put upon it by othervariables that have acted
autonomously,
The twenty deterniinaiitsenumerated above may bearranged into eight
groups, the members of eachgroup possessing certain propertiesin common.
The eightgroups follow.After the adjective describirigeach group are given
its members whichare identified by the Arabic numberspreceding them in the
above list.
I Demographic:1, 2, 4;
IIMaterja)j4; IIICultural:5, 6, 7;
IV Political:8, 9, 10;
V Structural:11, i2, 13;
VIRelationa114, 15;
VIIOrganizational:16, 17, 18, 19;
VIII Residual:20
The level ofper capita net product is governed by the twenty determi-
nants listed above,It foflothat a change in this level (i.e., A) will
follow upona change in any one of these determinantsThis change may be
Positive or negative accordinglyas the detrminant undergoes change that is
favor1e or unfavorable to the growth ofJ.If the determinants remain55 -
constant,wiil remain constant.If sanedetermjzants change inone dire c-
tion and others in an opposite direction,will increase, remainunchanged,
decrease accordingly as the net effect ofthese changes is positive,zero,
or negative.
The tnty determinants differ widelyin their capacity tproduce
changes in.Determinants 1,3,and 7-19 are each capable ofexerting only
a finite and relatively snail SflloUnt of influenceupon the growth of.For
example, there is a limit to the extent to whichthe age composition ofa
population may be altered in a manner favorableor unfavorable to the growth
of.There is a limit likewise to the extent to whichcan be affected
adversely or favorably by changes in the location of economicactivities,
Determinants5arid 6, by contrast, are capable of exercisingan income'
increasing or decreasing effect that is bothmore or less continuous and
quantitatively significant.Determinant 4 likewise appears capable of
affectingcontinuously but in a lesser measure than determinants 5 and 6.
Determinant 2 may affectAfor a long timo but in a manner quantitatively
much inferior to determinant 4.In the light of wMt has Just been said, it
is evident that growth of A will be governed predominantly by the movement
of determinants 5, 6, arxi4;that is, by changes in man's industrial arts,
in his cultural. equiinent, and in his material equipuent.
If6is selected to represent the course of growth of a society, it
becomes necessary also to account for the movement of the aggregate popula-
tion.The magnitude of P is governed by one or more of three factors:
the annual rateof natural increase, the annual net rateof immigration or
emigration, and the acquisition or loss of territory.The first of these
factors, the most important by far, is regulated principally by thecircumstances controlling mortalityand those elementsin a pels value
syst.eni which condition procreation.The second andthird factors reflect
socio-ecormic differences obtainingbetween the societyunder study and
other societies.
When is selected to representthe course of societalgrowth, it be-
comes necessary to recognize that a change inLmay operate through the
medium of some or all of the twentydeterminants of A listed above.In son
instanceswill be affected adversely; inothers it may be affected favor-.
ably, or it may not be affected at all.For example, the capacity of de-
terminants 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 to affectis not materially altered by changes
in the size of the population (i.e., P).Nor does it appear likely that an
increase in P will significantly affectt-.r"gh the medium of determinants
2, 10, 12, ar1 19.An increase in P may affectadversely through the
medium of determinants 11 and 14-18, but it need notnecessarily have this
effect.An increase in P will affectadversely through the medium of
determinant 4, and it may at least temporarily affect A adversely through the
medium of determInants 1, 3, and 13.
In the next section we present summary accounts of various theories o
societal growth.While none of these theories treatsor as the over-
riding Index of growth, each of these theories purports to throw light at
least indirectlyupon the course of arxl .
UI Representative Theories of Social Growth
This section outlines various theories of growth, detailed consideration of
which may disclose logically acceptable principles susceptible of empirical
verification or nonverjfication.The theories treated here relate to larger




1.The Logistic Theory of Growth
It is the purpose of a theory of growthto represent thesequential changes
manifested by the iinit (organism,
association, society, etc.) whosechange
in magnitude is under examination.If thesequence of changes regularly
manifested by all such individual unitscloselyconforms tosome given
function, "such that the implications of theformula are in accord with the
assumptions basic to the phenomenon observed,and suchthat evaluations ol'
the parameters of the formula determinedfrom random samples are mutually
consistent", we have (Will observes)a statistical law of growth which
expresses a probable, rather than a certain, inference",If theformula
connects thesequentialchanges as required by established knowledge, if
this knowledge is approximately complete, and ifthe formulafits the
observations alast perfectly, we have a rational law virtually devoid of
uncertainty.If, on the contrary, there is little previous knowledge i's-,
eciig the sequence of changes manifested, then the formula, even though
it fits very well the set of observations it describes, is empirical in
character and not necessarily descriptive of change sequences in other
growing units.If the defect of paucity of knowledge is corrected and both
approximate perfection of fit and full consistency with the implications of
the formulacontinue tobe realized, the formula takes on the character of a
rational law,If, however, extrapolation of the formula leads to absurd
results, or if it does not continue to fit observations closely, it is not
even a satisfactory empirical formula.2
Growth formulae presuppose, anng other things, that theunit under
Consideration undergoes changes inmagnitude withinan environment.Repre-
sentation ofa unit's growth by amathematical formula requires certainassumptions.(1)The unit must becapable of growingand susceptible, if
conditions are favorable enough, ofa constantgeometrical rate of increase.
(2)The rate of growth must alwaysbe a finiteand Continuous qiantity,but
,t necessarily geometric,(3)The snagnitucof the unit isa positive
quantity. (4,)The growth of the unittends toward restrictionwithin
definite bounds.This follows from thenature of growth and themilieuin
vtich it takes place The growing unit increasesits magnitude by absorbing
and converting into itself thesurrounding environnent.If this magnitude
re not finite the unit might growgeometrically.But the environment, is
finite, and this finiteness Imposesa limit on the aggregate growth of the
unit even when the increase of thelatter is not restricted by itsown
internal relations.Ifthe environment is heterogeneous incharacter, if' not
al]. components of the environmentare substitutable for one another, and if
growth requires various nonsubstitutablecomponents of the environment, then
the external liit4t to thegrowth of the unit will be imposed by the most
scarceof the irreplaceable components of the environnnt.3(5)Growth is
a fuzrit.jon of time and therefore subject to the influence of variousfactors
'those effectsmay change through time.(6)The basic conditions of growth
are not subject to disturbing influences thatmay significantly alter the
course OfgrowthFor if a growthinfluencing factor different from those
that have operatedwithinthe historical jriod of the unit'sgrowth become
Operative, the initially selected growth formula no longer fits the facts;
itilLU8tbe replaced, if possible, by a newformulaconsistent with both the
old and thenew facts.4
Because these six assumptions are takenintoaccount by the logistic
formula, arid becausethis formula has often been found to represent populationgrowth, cultural diffusion, and other kindsof increasesatisfactorily, it
probably" ranks first among the forniu].aeSUppOsedly suited both todepict
observed facts and to make for consistencybetween previouslyestablished
ktw1edge arid the implications of theformula itself.5For like reasons the
Gompertz curve has also been used.Since the logisticand the Gompertz
growth curves are asymptotic, neitherformula provides for thepossibility of
a decirin the znagnithde of the unitWhose growth is beingstudiet.
The logistic curve resembles boththe normal frequency ogiveand the
Goinpertz.Let L stand for the logistic andL' for its first derivative;
N for the normal frequency ogive and N'for itfirst derivative (i.e., the
normal curve); G for the Gompertz and G'for its first derivativeThe
derivative in each case represents thesuccessive increments of growth
(i.e., first differences) ofthe parent trend curve plotted against time.
L' closely resembles N', and N usuallyrepresents given data nearly as well
as ckes L; for L is constructed on the aipposition that the growthincrements
of the reciprocals decline bya constant percentage, and in the case of both
and N' the increments of growth rise to and then decline froma maximum
in a regular andsymmetrical manner.6 By contrast G' is slightly skewed, for
G describesa series in hich the growth incrennts of the logarithms are
declining by a constant percentage.All three parent curves are based upon
the assumption,therefore, that the increments of growth of the unit In
question increase regularly froma very low value to a maximum and then
decline regularlytoward zero as a limit.The task of the growth theorist
is to discover,in the event that such a curve represents observed growth
With highprecision, the mechanism arid the linkages whichcompel the unit to
grow J.ri themanner indicated.a 60 a
Jt US suppose (as H. Hart does) thatin a diffusion situationthere
inheres a max.imum number of possibilities of diffusionsuch thatrepresents
the proportion of these possibilities already achievedandthe proportion
yet to be achieved.The number of pregnantcontacts at any time is propor-
tional toand the cumulative number ofcombinations effected is propor-
tional to the integral of.If dth = 1, we select the particular
values .1, .2, .3, .4, .3, .2, .1 and the correspondentvalues .9,.,
,..,.1, theva]nes to which the irxrements of growth correspondare:
.09, .16, .21, .24, .25, .24, .21, 46, and .09.If we plot these increments
against time we get an approzimation of Lt, and if we summate themget an
approximation of L.
Before we consider this problem further let us examine the findings of
Hornell Hart who has assembled more than 100 instances in which the logistic
type of curve closely conforms to the recorded observations of growth,
usually (in those cases in which L has been contrasted with N or G) more
closely than the Gonipertz or the normal frequency ogive.7He reports the
logistic as satisfactorily representing the growth of the following niagni-.
tudes or units:human and subhuman populations; the number of functions
performed by given governmental units; agricultural andindustrial production,
by country; inventions and patents; other indice5 of economic growth;the
diffusion of specific cultural traits (e.g., use of educationalinstitutions,
motor vehicles, and forms of communication; spread ofgiven types of state
legislation; developeient of various civic movementsand social practices);
indices of social efficiency (life expectancy,speed records for horizontal
motion, nonstop airplane flights; per capitaincomes; the area of empires;
inafl1s power to kill and to kill at a distance,etc.).Hart concludes,- 61
therefore, that the closeconformation of thedata to the logistic pattern
probably is an expression, notof chance, but of'some law of naturet, which
the study of diffusion phenomenamay reveal.
It has already been noted thatasymptotic growth curves suchas the
logistic must be defective factuallyarxi. theoretically inrespect to their
capacity to represent aril predictsubsequent growth whenever the basiccon-
ditions of growth cease to be stableand the parameters of the forecasting
formula cease to remain unchanged.(a)Since the logistic formula pre-
supposes the existence of an asymptotic maximum value, it isunsuited to
forecast a decline in the magnitude of the unitwse growth is being studied.
(b)For the same reason the logistic cannot foretellthe movement of the
index of growth on to a higher and differentcurve.Hart proposes ccmpound
logistic curves as a partial solution of difficulty (b).
"Throughout the entire sep of history and prehistory, thepower of
human beings to achieve their basic purposes has been increasing at
accelerating speed, with local and temporary stagnations and setbacks.
This long-run acceleration has taken place through series of logistic
and Gonipertz surges, having higher ari higher rates of increase
These upsurges, which are remindful of the emergence of higher social levels
as postulated by dialectical materialism, "are often inaugurated, disrupted,
or terminated by crises, such as basic inventions,...discoveries,...wars,...
and major economic depressionsI.This hypothesis (which seems to be shared
in part by a number of sociologists) runs counter at times to the logistic
postulate of a declining rate of increase; it offers no satisfactory basis
for long-run prediction; it does not seem to take into account the fact that
the larger the ratio of the maitude of the growing unit to itS controlling
environment, the more likely are limitationl factors to impose adeclining
incremental rate of growth ari to prevent an upsurge.62 -
With respect to income, population,and territorial data,all of which
are closely related to our index(see sec. U above),Hart finds:(a) in
the 1930's per capita income and wages in£uro-kierican countriesappeared
to be moving onto a new and higher logisticcurve; (b) population growth
usially has not deviated far from the pathdelineated by a logistic; (c) it
is probable that the rise of airpower will greatlyincrease the area under
one government just as the replacement of lancower byseapower did in the
modern period.
The upshot of our discussion for the theoryof the rise and fall of
societies seems to be as follows:(1) The logistic is stillan empirical
and not a rational curve; it is not well auited for prediction relative to
times much forward from the present; it does not yet restupon knowledge of
the social mechanism that links successive growth events.(2)The logistic
can be employed to depict the growth of a society only if relevant and
representative indices of growth can be established.(3)Despite its short-
comings the logistic may be employed empirically to isolate growth phenomena
and discover the causes of deviations Irvin a seemingly satisfactory function.
It has theoretical nrit in that it emphasizes both the internal determinants
of growth arid the increasingly powerful external )imitations imposed by
environment.If logistic curves were employed, in so far as statistically
feasible, to represent all measurable growth and diffusion phenomena for
each society; if these curves were carefully compared and correlatedwithin
each society; and if interaociety comparisons then weremade to discover
intersociety differences; then a basis, largelyempirical but sanewhat
rational, for a theory of societal growth might beestablished.-63--
2 hausti0n ofCriticalNatuBl Resourcesand/or ofRelatively Unoccupied
Space
This appiv*ch is similar to but less orderlythanthat treated under (1);
moreover, it does not postulate an upper limit and itadmits thepossibility
of decline.
According tothistheory, in so faras socio-econoniic activity is founded
upon the exploitation and use of particular resources, their exhaustion
(partial or complete) imposes upon the Society the necessityeither of dis-
covering substitutes or of redirecting economic activityso as to free the
economy of dependence upon the resources in question.If, in the event of
such exhaustion, the society is unable or unwilling to purseither of these
corrective courses, there results acrisis which maywen e succeeded by the
declineof the affected society.
In the jast a decline in soil fertility,usuallyattributed to a shrink-
age in rainfall or to soil-exhausting agricultural practices, has been ad-
vancedas an explanation of the economic decline of ancient Rome, of the
English enclosure movement, of important Anrican social developnents, of
significant Eurasian migrations, of adverse Chinese agricultural conditions,
etC.8Today, with the material basis of modern society consistingof
minerals as vll as of land, concern is expressed respecting theprospective
exhaustion of each of these material elements.9
Analysis along lines of resourceexhaustion callsfor a distinction
between forms of exhaustion that are irvitableand unavoidable,(e.g., of
oil, coal), and forms that canbeaverted.For in the latter case thelocus
of the cause of resource exhaustion must be sought inthe alterable culture
aiXipractices of the society and not in theinvariant properties ofits
material ba8e,-64-.
the resources singledout for specialtreatnnt space hasbeen
accorded aost attention.Many Americanhistorians, of whom F.J. Turnerwas
the principal if notthe first,have dweltupon the importance ofa single
geographic factor,thefrontier.Al]. of them havefound in the nK,des oflife
prevalentat the frontier thesource of various Americansocio-economjc
practices, and8OflE have found inthe supposedopportunity workers had of
moving to or toward the frontiera kind of 'safety valve' thateased when it
did not prevent social pressures andgroup conflict in the long settled
eastern partsof the United States.In consequence, thesehistorians infer,
the 'disappearance' (at ornear the turn of the century) of the western
frontier has contributed and Is stillcontributing greatly to the prodection
of ehanges (e.g., the increased emphasisupon a collective provision of soclo-
economic security) In theconduct-determining American value-system and to
the accentuation of the struggleaspect of relations between 'labor' and
'management' and between other importantinterest-groupings of the popula-
tion.Upon the appearance of Lord Keynes a 'general theory' itsexponents
(particularly A. k-I. Hansen)incorporated the closed-space theory of the
Turnerites into the Keynesian explanation of thecourse of economic events
and made the disappearanceof frontier areas for lateral growth a major
Component of the mature.economya.st,agiatjon account.Forthepresent dis-
cussion the issue of the controversyover the effects of the supposed dis-
appearance of open space isDoes the passing of the frontier tend to set
In fltiona series of events which carry the economy of a society Into a
statlonaisy oradecliningphase?How are these event linked?10
The approach of geopolitics may be described as a closed-space approach.
Its two leadingexponents, Friedrlch Ratzel and II.J. Mackinder, haveimplied65
that, because of cultural arid otherimperatives that,are geographic inori-
gin, the emergence of a single world empireis 1r1P1'oSpeQt.Thjimpl1catjo
raises two distinct questions:hat is thesource of theexpansionist ini-
perative?Given such an imperative,What will bethe geographicChrin1 of
expansion?The ansr to the firstquestion must beSoc jo-cultural in charac-..
ter.For example, ifIftties differmarkedly respectingthe rules to be
applied in external, intersocietyrelations, the needfor common rulesmay
lead to the establishment, throughalliances aril/orconquest, of largerareas
within which one set of rules becomesoperative; and thisprocess may continue
in the modern world until, throughagreement or through the initialispoaltion
of force by the stronger societyor group of societies,a single set of rules
is operative throughout the world.If, for the indicatedor some other cul-
tural reason, a societyor group of societies is underpressure to expand, the
pathways of this expansion willbe governed largely by the principlesof
political and militarygeography.The literature of geopolitics, therefore,
is more suitedto indicate the pathways of expansion thanto disclose whether
or not expansion willtake place ,'1
Several writers have suggested thatfrontier areas are peculiarly suited
to facilitatehuman progress.The 'industrial evolution' took place in
eatern Lurope ratherthan elsewhere, concludes C. E. Ayres,12 because
est5rnurope, being the frontier region of Mediterranean civilization,
Could adept thetech1ogical accumulations of that civilization and ret for
the tinebeing remain free of its accumulated institutional rigidities.
e8tern Europewas able,therefore, to respond freely to the new inventions
and diacoirjesinfoduced during the early modern period and get the indus-
trialrevolution underway before institutional rigidities got the upper hand,66 -
F. J. Teggartnotes that new ideasystems tend to flourishat the frontiers
separatng dive rae culture8.
"Human advancement follows upon themental release, of the members of a group or of a single individual, from theauthority of an established system.This release has, in thepast, been occasioned through the
breaking down of previous idea-systeme byprolonged struggles beten
opposing groups which have been broughtinto conflict as a result of tiinvoluntary zxvements of peoplesWhat follows is the building
up of a new idea-system, which is not a simple cumulation of the
knowledge previously accepted, but the productof critical activity
stirred by the perception of conflicting elements in theopposed
idea-systems"
T*ggart's approach permits hits to put an expansionist interprethtionupon
factors (such as diminution in rainfall) which ccinpelmen to migrate and thus
precipitate collision and conflict betven diverse cultures at the termini of
routes of migration.Basically the theories of Ayres and Teggart suggest
thisgMien peoples bearing tdiverse cultures are thrown into contact undez
circumstances that prevent either culture from swamping the other, individuals
will be freed from the grip of each culture and a new culture conducive to
human adtanceznent wili come into being.
The existence of an open frontier may have facilitated economic growth
not only by conducing to the dissipation of institutional rigidities, but also
by producing conditions favorable to a mass demand.The developuent of a
mass demand calls for at least two circunrstares, arelatively high wage lev
el and a sufficient amount of like-mindedness in tIE consumer population to
induce them to purchase standardized and, therefore,relatively cheap, con-
mimer goods.If a frontier is open and land is tobe had on relatively favor-'
able terms, the wage level will be relatively high.This was the case In
eighteenth and nineteenth century merica.If the frontier attracts migrants
of diverse ethnic, national, and familial backgrounds,tastes and attitudes
will be fluid rather than set; and therewill be opportunity for the-67-
dveiopnent and spread of similar tastes towhich the producersof standard-
ized articles may cater,This, too, was thecase in eighteenth and nine-
teenth and early twentieth century America,It is quite likely,therefore,
that the ]1ng-contined existence of an opan frontierin America contributed
appreciably to the rise of those niassProduction COnsumer goods industries
which appear to have played an important part inmaintaining and evenac-
celerating her rate of economic growth.
An ana].ysis analogous to that of the role of theopening and the closing
of space may be made and is being made of the spreadof what might be called
the urban frontier.For the urbanization of the population apparentlyis
operating today, as it has at times in the past (e.g., Hdllenistic,Roman,
late Medieval times), to produce significant changes in the value-systemsof
societies, changes which could bring about the decirof the affected
societies1
Analysis of the behavior of the firms composing an industry suggests
that the advent of the later retarded-growth stage is accompanied by a
diminution of the competition operating in the earlier rapid-growth stage.
It is likely thata careful analysis of the economic behavior of the com-
ponents of a state or society moving (usually as a result of the slowing
doof population growth consequent upon the widespread adoption of the
8flal1 family system) into the retarded-growth stage would reveal a concomitant
accentuation of social processes resistant to further growth)4
3hjmernce of Higher Levels of Integration
with theemergence in a society of a higher levelof organization(.g,,
nversjon ol' many anall geographical units into one largeone), growth rates
8urge to new arid higher levelsThis approach to theproblem of growth stems
from both theemergent evolutionists and thehistoricalmaterialists)5- 68 -
Joseph Needharn has described this approachas follows:
"The world we know is compounded OfOrganizatjoand Energy;, ..theworld is a series of levels of organizatjo,
integration, andcomplexity;.., these levels occur both in time (evolutionary
succession) and inspace (morphological envelopes) ,,ilb
"As we rise in the evolutionary scalefrom the virusesand protozoa to the social primates there is*(1) a rise inthe number of parts
and envelopes of the organism andthe complexity oftheir morphologi- cal forms and geometrical relations;(2) a rise in theeffectiveness of the control of their functions bythe organismas a whole; (3) a
rise in the degree of independenceof the organism from itsenviron.-
ment, involving diversification andextension of range of theorgan-
lain's activities; (4) a rise in theeffectiveness with which the
individual organism carries out itspurposes of survival and repro.-
duotion, including the power of moldingIts environment,"1?
This approach, while here directed principallyto organic life, is deemed
generalizable to social life; itseems to emphasize collective and comimina.l
life and to play down that of the individual.]-8
Illustrative of this approachas well as of the closed space view is
R. Glenday's analysis of the future ofthe British economy.An economy is
built up over theyears through the specialization and reciprocal adaptation
of the population and the environìment.Because of the increasing resistance
encc1ntered by growth under the present organjtion of the economy, it will
either beco,statiory or disintegrate unless the basic structure of the
economy is reorganized ina manner analog,us to that which accompanied the
change..over from the medieval to the modern system in the eighteenth century.
Industrial societyis in its last phase, and the "service state" is in the
offing.Waves of growth are described as "the result of an economic system
Undergoing an enlargement in its capacity and a continuous rise in its level
raflhationN; and growth as consisting of two successive phases,the
alteration of thestructure to permit the new wave tostart, and the wave
itself,- 69 -
"Economic evolution must...bepictured as a series of revo1utiorts times of discontinuous qualitativechanges in structure alternating with longer periods of continuouscaantitatjve modifications of these rovelties in structure, bya process involving progressive speciali- sation and adaptation.Such speciilisatjon and adaptationentai].s a
progreesive 1088 of freedom by theseparate individual unit elements of the system to fit them for the formof economic life chosen for the coninunity.If external circumstanceschange suddenly or growth
in some important organ within thegroup is aliowed to proceed to the point of upsetting thegroup mode of life adopted, then the
system, being unable to evolve furtherin the direction selected,
has no alternative to dissolution andextinction. Each stage in
this advance has not only involveda change in the form of the
system as a whole but also a prior regrouping into largerand more
compact tbricksl of the constituent units out of which thenew
whole has to be built
The historical materialist asswis that change isever present in a
society, dth every sufficient quantitative change operating to transform
that which is changing and to cause new qualities toemerge.
"While there is continuous change, there are alsQ relative stabilities,
temporary unities reached as a result of the complex interpenetration,
the interplay of forces, energies and elements which come into con-
tact with one another.While everything is on the move, the very
interplay of movements forms patterns distinguishable as such for a
greater or lesser period of tinie."2°
Within the socio-'economic system "the relations in which men stand" to tech-
nics and forces of production "and to one another in respect to them", change
as these forces and technics changeThe changes are caused by struggles
among the several ckssss, each of which includes members with a coxzn re-
lationahip (e.g., control, or its opposite) to the nans of production.
"The progressive Improvement of any system of technics reaches a
point where its further advance, or, in other vrds, themost
efficient utilization of the possibilities it now presents,is
obstructed and impeded by the prevailing systemof ecominic
relationships."
Then, because the class structure can no longer absorb thedeveloping forces
of production, and despite the interests of the rulingclass, the prevailing
economic system "must eventually be modifiedradically to accommodate further
technical change it2lIn this way a higherlevel of organization is intro-
dueed.70
The economic factor istreated as the freevariable, the primemover,
ctnu1ative changes in whicheventually transfothat part of thesuper-
structure with *ich theycome to be in Contradiction.Technological
(i.e., agronoinic and engineering)developments
"produce difficulties thatpit the existent classsystem (i.e., 'the relations ofmen to each other in production') intoa state of unstable equilibrium,Segments of the social superstructure
are involved in the economic probleminsofar as they obstruct or assist in its solution.A process of social reconstruction gets under way.tt22
Although the exponents of historicalmeterialisin believe that it can
be made to serve as a theory ofany particular social system (e.g., feudal-
ism, capitalism, socialism, communism, etc.),23they usuaUy employ it to
explain the supposedly forthcoming declineof 'capitalism and its super-
session by socialism, to show how the development and accentuationof
'contradictions' during the so-called monopoly and imperialism phases of
capitalism will generate its downfall.24Whether it is expected that these
contradictions will suffice, JB rticularly in the relatively near future, if
unassisted by war, is not too evident in Soviet writings.25
With respect to what has been said several conclusions follow:
(1) The concept of emerging higher levels of organization should prove use-
ful in the analysis of the growth, but not of the decay, of societies,
provided that the changing level is defined in operational terms that are
relevant to the specific magnitudes under consideration.(2) The economic
factor' if operationally defined, may be employed as a point of departure
in the study of erowth; but It may not, in the light of present knowledge
and theory, be treated as an independent variable and a prime mover.The
economic factor, while perhaps the most Important of all the variables in
social organization, is still but one of many variables, to which it isV
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functionally related in botha dependent and anindependent sense.Much
more than has been cne remains to bene before the actual role of the
economic factor in different culturescan be appraised, beforewe know how
much play and therefore lag there isin the collection of variablesthat
comprise an essentially closed andinterdependent system, and beforewecan
comprehend the comparative flOvelty-creatingpower of the variables compris-
ing a societal system.26
4Activation by a Creative Minorit.
That growth is primarily the result of the activityof a creative and
innovating minority is the conc]nsion of A. Toynbee, J. Schwnpeter,and
V. Pareto, among others,It should be noted, however, that this conclusion
as such is inadequate.For even though the paramount role of the creative
minority be granted, it does not determine the particular forms that the
creative efforts of this minority will assume.If there is a high degree
of complementarity among these various forms, then all will flourish in
about the same measure at the sane timeIf there is relatively little
complementarity, the forms m&y be many or few, the actual number depending
at any time upon the specific cultural c]Jinate then in effect.27In any
event, the extent to which the course of economic growth is associated with
the activity of the creative minority is governed by the degree to which
this minority is econonically creative.
(a) The unit of study aeleGtsd by Toyit*e28 is the civilized society,
or civilization.He identifies twenty-six suchunits.Five of them are
described as arrested; of the remaining twenty-one,six emerged from primi-
tive life while fifteen stemmed from previouscivilizations.Of the twenty-
six units, sixteen are dead, nine are broken down,and only one, our own
Weattrn, is still alive and active.' 72 -
Each of these civilizations, Toynbeebelieves, had its origin,not in
'superiority' of race or in ease ofenvironment, but in thec apacity of the
populations generating the civilizationto respond successfully toa chal.
lenge that was neither so weak as to fareas a stimulus, nor so strong as to
be insurmountableeFor some successful populationsthis challenge consisted
In the necessity they vre under to cop witha hard environment, br to
?ring virgin soil under cultivation; for others, inthe penalization
(e.g., slavery) imposed upon them byscine other temporarily master popula-
tion; for still others, in crushing defeats,or in continual pressure against
their frontiers from without."Growth occurs when the response to a particu-
lar challenge is not only successful in itself but provokesa further
challenge which again meets with a successful response,"When, on the
contrary, a challenge is so great as to cause the responding population to
introduce an inflexible social system, its capacity to make successful re-
sponses to further challenges is atrophied, and its civilization becomes an
arrested one.
Growth is given a particularized meaning by Toynbee.It does not con-
sist in increasing control over material environment, or In the military and
political expansion of a society at the expense of neighboring societies.
It Consists in the progress of a society towards self-determination; in the
release of Its energies (occasioned by its initial overcoming of material
obstacles) " to make responses to challenges which henceforth are internal
rather than external, spiritual rather than material."Growth "involves
differentiation between the parts of a growing society" whereas disintegra-
tion is accompanied by stanthrdization.- 73 -
The breakdown of a civilization is athand whenitsperiod of growth
comes to an end;when a society rlonger is able, eitherby readaptingits
old institutions or by establishing appropriatenew institutions,to ac-
commodate and develop the new social forces releasedby Its creative mem-
bers,
Of crucial significance in Toynbee's theory is the"creative minority",
upon whose behavior depends the course ofasocietys civilization."AU
growth originates with creative minorities of individuals, and their task
is twofold:first the achievement of their inspiration or discovery,
whatever it may be, and secondly the conversion of the society to which
they belong to this new way of life
'The conversion of the mass comes
about through their willingness to imitate the creative minority and
render its members allegianceThe breakdown of civilization takes place
when,becauseof thefailureof the creative power of this minority, the
majority withdraw their allegiance and mimesis (i.e., imitation of the
creatIve minority), and the consequent division of the society into parts
ends Its social unity.The breakdown, therefore, is internal rather than
external.It does not originate in a decline in technique and aresultant
loss ofcontrol over environment; neither does it originatein external
military aggression and consequent geographical contraction - atype of
challenge that sometimes even provides the very stimulasneeded to rouse a
civilization from its torpor.
Toyribee finds that "a group whichsuccessfully responds to onechal-
lenge 18 rarely the successful respondent to thenext."For this failure,
loss of creativity on the part of the creativeminority Is responsible.
This loss may assume various forms.For example, It mayissue out of a- 74 -
society's idolization of an ephemeral institution or ofan ephemeral tech-.
nie, and its consequent failure to develop and/or adopt an appropriate
new institutionor technique.Again it may originate in suicidal militar-
jam, i.e., in the practice of continuous aggression which unites the
neighbors of the aggressoragainst himand eventually exhausts his power
and resources.
en the creative minority loses its creative power, the unity ofthe
society is destroyed and it becomes exposed to external attack.Thecrea-
tive minority,unable any longertocommand the voluntary ndznesis and
allegiance of the majority, becomes a dominant minority which nowmust rely
upon force and/or upon the establishment of arelatively inflexible social
systemtomaintain control overthemass and preserve the status cpo.The
majority in consequence becomes "a reluctant and alienated
tpro1etariat ",
an"inner proletariat" that includes all who feel "themselves'in' but not
'of' the society."A parallel chge takes placein populations surround-
ing the society whose creative minority has become adominant minority.
For these populations, friendly to the culturalinfluence of the civiliza-
tion in ciestion so long as it was growing, nowbecome hostile to it,with
the result that a iujj.jtary frontier is establishedbetween this civiliza
tion and the surrounding "externalproletariat."The pressure of one or
both of these proletariats tends eventuallytocomplete the disintegration
of the civilization whose creative minorityhas ceased tobe creative.
Toynbee'e method of analysis, asapplied by him tothe lone actively
surviving though tottering civilized
society, is not asrevealing as it
might be.Presumably, because ofthe great shrinkagein the size ofwhat
Toynbeecallsthe externalproletariatof thestern World,this group- 75 -
constitutes no great danger to the 1estern World.But Toynbee does find in
Western Society a great potential internal proletariat which includes the
man-power of tendisintegrating civilizations, the populations of primitive
societies, and the large number of nmbera of tho intelligentsia who are not
disposed torenderallegiance to such creative minority as still exists.
His discussion suggests, however, that disintegration can yet beaverted
and WesternSociety's capacity for self-determination rQstored if it is
reinvigoratedbyChristianity and transmuted into a Resiiblica Christiana.
For purposes of the present discussionToynbee's principal suggestions
ares(a) the course of a civilization (e.g., its riseand/or fall) is
governed by the degree of creativeness characteristicof the creative
minority; (b) the primummobile isto be found within a society;(c) jim-
provenient in technique and increase in thedegree of control exercisedby
a society over its environment arenot closely associated withthe state of
a society's growth (as definedby Toynbee), and may evenbe taking place at
the very time a society's real civilizationis declining.These sugges-
tions, tbe of use, must boemployed in conjunctionwith a valid theory
of process, of which thereislittle evidence inToynbee'S work.
(b) Schumpeter' s analysis of thefundamental role ofthe innovatin
entrepreneur (who is much morethan anentrepreneur) in giving shapeand
content to economics is confinedto the n)dernperiod during whichcapi-
talism rose and flourishCd. By innovationis meant either(a) the recom-
biriing of a given qiarLtity ofproductive factorsin such manner asto aug
ment their exchange valuesignificantlY, or(b) thecombiing of pro-
ductive factors in such wise asto produce agiven good at anappreciablY
lower relative factor cost thanhas theretoforeobtained.Under competitivecapitalism the innovation arises out of the conjunction ofa creative
entrepreneur with something like a new invention or anew mode oforganiza-
tion that will constitute a basis for recodnbination.The innovation gives
its entrepreneurial executor a differential advantage that will last until
the innovation and its secondary improvements are generally adopted, and
allows him, through his realization of aunented profits and his increased
borrowing power, greatly to expand the affected industrial units under his
control.A great stimulus is imparted to firms and industries both comple-
mentary to and competitive with the innovator's, the former receiving the
stimulus of an upsurged market., the latter being compelled to apply the
innovation (or its equivalent) or suffer elimination; and lethargy is
shaken even in circles that do not fall strictly within the complementary
and the competitive categories.The innovation process in general, and in
particular the successive waves of influence isiing from a given groupof
closely related innovations while it is being incorporatedinto the economy,
are intimately linice d, schumpeter attempts toshow, with the various
economic movements registered within an economy; andthe economy itself
behaves much more junipij.y than is suggested by theprinciple Marshall
adopted from Leibniz, "nature never makes leaps".
While the innovator is treated as theprincipal prime mover, he isnot
free of the social climate in which he operatesand which is in partthe
outcome of prior innovations. trustified capitalismreplaces competi-
tive capitalism, the innovating process passesfrom the small andoften new
firms dominated by individuals to large,impersonal, bureaucratized finns
that. rely upon specil1zed and organizedresearch; and theindustrial
leader who is chosen by the associatedselective systemL3no longer-77-.
uniqiely the man who made the firm's success possible, but a man who, though
he may have had little to do with mich success as a firm has had, possesses
the earmarks of political acceptability rather than qialitiea bespeaking
technical competence.Meanwhile the routinization of innovation and
technological progress, together with the gerral acceptance of the prin-
ciple of continual change, are renring the entrepreneurial function
obsolete; while the elimination by trustification of many small entre-
preneurs and the increasing renval of theentrepreneurial function from
both executive and stockholder are dissolving thebourgeois class whence
innovators have largely come in the post.These circumstances, together
with the seemingly associated changes in ideology, areslowly operating,
Schumpeter's analysis suggests, to decomposecapitalism and replace it by
another system.
Studies of the p&st illuminatethe historical role of theentrepreneur,
but they do not reveal much respectingthe future because of thefunda-
mental difference between a society inthjch rule-of-thumbpredominated
and one in which routinized scienceprevails.30Thus Pirenne found that
in Europe, in the milleniuin closing withthe nineteenth century,during
each of the alternating epochs of freedomand control, a newset of capi-
ta.lists, distinct as to origin fromthose it replaced,superseded the
earlier set whose frnll ies, unwilling orunable to adapt tothe changing
circumstances of business, movedinto the aristocracy,the bureaucracy,and
the rentier groups.31The entrepreneurialfunction and theinnovation
process rre not, however,routinized andbureaucratized, and sodiffered
from what prevails today or mayprevail in the future.
iiOf the various possible points ofdeparture for the study of the
growth of societies, the innovator probably isuperior to any alternative;
for since he is at the center of the growthprocess, one can sense from his
vantage all the principal checks to andfacilitators of innovation,However,
Schumpeter's account of the recent historyof the innovator and hissugges-
tion that the latter will not be needed undersocialism is not too convinc-
ing.Routine, as I1dtehead notes, is the basisof social life and the
source of practical efficiency and societal stability.But routine, while
more fundamental than understanding, cannot costlesaly take its place; for
complete routine is incompatible with novelty-producing instabilityor with
such progress as issues from the generation and the judicious adeption of
novelty.32Yet there is a strong presumption that under socialism political
selection wifl operate, much more than does present (or prospective) economic
selection, A into positions of politico-economic power those whose
sole god is routino.33Accordingly, appraisal of the behavior and prospec-
tive growth of a social system must take into account how innovators are
chosen, how they in turn choose among the potentialities accessible at any
time, and how they respond to the prevailing value system.
The effects of innovation are conditioned also by the nature of the
economy into which they are introthced.If the economy is competitive and
flexible an innovation tends to step up the rate of growth of welfare.If,
however, an economy is c.jminated by monopoly, this rate of growth willbe
influenced in a lesser dcgree.
(c) Pareto's theory of interciass circuktion assumes asociety hier-
archical in structure and with power concentrated inthe hands of an elite
ithose number is verynall relatively to that ofthe non-elite.Accordingly,- 79 -
if jjls differ in respect to their concretevalues and actien tend-
encies aM if there is interelass mobility of individuals,a relatively
small movement of persons from the non-elite into theelite can greatly
modify the composition of the latter in respect to valuesand action tend-
encies and, because of the large amount of power concentrated in the hands
of the elite, produce a significant change in the societal system.Thus,
if there are two kinds of individuals I aM II; if the elite and the n(rn-
elite comprise, respectively, 8 and 92 percent of the population, with I
and II forming half of each category, then if two non-elite I's (i.e.,
one-forty-sixth of the non-elite population) replace two (i.e., one-fourth)
elite fit5, the I's become ascendant in the elite of kich they now con-
stitute three-fourths.The behavior of the elite will be changed signifi-
cantly while that of the underlying non-elite mass will remain substantially
unchanged.
Real society, as Pareto conceived it, corresponds to this hypothetical
society.There are two classes of residues, Class I and ClassII, highly
significant for the present discussion.Persons in whom Class I, the
"instinct of combinations", predominates, are innovating,inventive, pro-
jecting, scheming; disposed to avoid conflict, to circumventobstacles,
and to use direct methods; inclined to prefer the present,the material, and
the individual to their opposites.Persons in whom ClassII, the "per-
sistence of aggregates", predominates are steadfast,direct, willing to
accept conflict and use force, given totraditionalism rather than in-
novativeness, lacking in cleverness,and disposed to preferthe future, the
ideal, and the collectivity (e.g., family orstate) to their opposites.
In sum, then, a typical society consists of twokinds of individualswhose- 80 -
action tendencies are rather atopposite poles.Accordingly, how the so-
ciety is run will depend largely upon whether I or II dominates tne elite;
while any change in the composition of the ).atter, resulting fromintercl*sa
circulatkn that replaces I (or II) in the elite by II (or I) from thenon-
elite, will markedlyalter the elite andits collectivebehavior tendendes.
Typically, Pareto auggests, the II's (lions) seize power only gradually to
give place to the I's (foxes) whare better adapted to execute nises and
other power-holding tricks until I's dominate; the I's, however, overindulge
their fox-like traits until they are again overthrown by the II'sIn eco-
nomic matters the are speculators whereas the IIs are rentiers and
savers, while in ideology the I's favor science and skepticism and the U's,
religion, ideals, etc.Whence,since the ascent of the I's into political
power isalso accompanied, as a rule, by an increase in their economic
power, bursts of economic prosperity and skepticism tend tocharacterize the
initiation of rule by the I's.Even asupposedlyproduction-depressing
state policy such as protectionism tendstobe more than offset by the
stinulus and support it imparts toinnovating,industry-creating i'.35
Pareto noted that some conditions favor interciasscirculation more than
others.
The significance of Pareto's analysis forthe theory of societal growth
lies not so much in the theory itself as in itsemphasisuponthe importance
of social mobility or intergroup circulation ofindividuals in a society
when (as in most cases) its class and social structureis hierarchical and
whenthe composition of the stream of personsmoving into th? upperportions
of the social pyramid differs significantlyfrom that of thepopulation
Occupying these upper portions.For such circulation cangreatly influence
conduct-deternilning values andaction-tendencies in asociety even thoughI
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the overall composition of the societyremains essentialily unchanged.The
significance of political, economic, andsocial circulation for economic
and related growth needs to be thorouly explored,
5Change in Biological Composition of Population.
Continuous dysgenic selection can bring aboutthe decline of a society,
particularly if the composition of the rulingclasses undergoes a deoline
parallel to that of the whole population; whilecontinuous eugenic selection
can produce an opposite set of effects.In either case, the influence of
biological selection would manifest itselfvery slowly, and the direction
and character of the manifestation would be determined by the specific
culture of the affected population.
The information relevant to human biological selection is not as
adequate nor as critically interpreted as is required.Huntington36 pre-
sents evidence intended to sbow that favorable biological selection accounts
in appreciable degree for the accomp1ishiants of a number of people (e.g.,
Icelanders, Parsis, New England Puritans, Jews).while the decline of
Rome has sometimes been attributed to dysgenic selection,most of the
discussion of dysgenics in human societies relates to the prospective
future.Specifically it is contended, and supporting statistical data are
offered, that in a mobile, democratic society such as Great Britain orthe
United States, the level of intelligence is falling because in thegeneti-
cally inferior strata net natural increase is higher than among thegeneti-
cally superior.38
The most fufly developed biological theoryof the rise and fall of
nations is that of CGini.A demographic upsurge onthe part of a nation
originates, as a rule, in crossbreeding betweenappropriately differenti-
ated strains of this nation, or between tiiis nationand somo other82
appropriately differentiated nation.This upsurge is accentuated at first
bythfact that, since each generation derives froma small and relatively
more fecund fraction of the preceding generation, the nation's natural
fecundity increases.Meanwhile, however, the germinal cells of thepopu-
lation gradually undergo exhaustion until this force more than balances
the force of past hybridization a nd selection.Then demograiiic decline
sets in unless it can be averted through a new resort to reinvigorating
crossbreeding.Military, economic, ani political rise and decline tend to
be associated with the demographic rise and fall of nations.39
Intergroup differences in population growth, whether the result of
natural increase or of net migration, are more important, in the short run
at least, on cultural than on biological grounds.Individuals are bearers
of cultures and value-systems even as they are carriers of genes.If
individuals differ widely in respect of culture and system of values,
differential rates of growth will significantly alter thecultural compo-
sition of the population and thus ast in motion changeswhich can alter the
basic drift and emphases of the culture and value-systemcharacteristic of
a society and produce profound political,economic, and other changes.
Such a change took place in the Graec'-Roman worldand has probably been
initiated more than once since.60
GinVs theory, if it is to be employedin the study of growth,must be
combined with other theories, for it islogically and factually inadequate
as it stands,That continuing changein the biologicalcomposition of a
society's population will ultimatelyand significantlYinfluence Its course
of growth is incontestableOf probably greaterimportance than thebio-
logical consequences of intergroup differencesin growth, however,is the
great change that such differences rny producein the culturaland value-83 -
system oompoaition of a society's population,
6 Price Movements.
Rising prices have contributed to economic growth bothby facilitating
capital formation and by dissolving stagnation_pro&cjngsocial arrange-
ments; sharply falling prices have exercised an opposite effect.Because
price movements leave tracks they constitutean empirically satisfactory
means of getting at aspects of the problem of growth.Analysis of past
price movements may be of less significance for the future, however, than
some other analyses, insofar as fortuitous movements of the sort registered
in the past are prevented from taking place in the future.
For suggestions of the influence of past price movements we may turn
to the works of E. J. Hamilton, Lord Keynes, and F. Simiand.
Professor Hamilton has shown in a number of papers how profit inflation
consequent upon alongsustained lag of wages behind prices contributed
greatly to the rise of capitalismandthe revolutionary character of eight-
eenth century industrialization.Thring the two centuries succeeding 1500
the profits flowing from the East India trade and the rise of prices rela-
tive to wages occasioned by the influx of merican treasure were employed
to build up capital equipment.Again in the second half of the eighteenth
century the lag of wages behind prices provided the stimulus that caused
industrial development to move at a revolutionary rather than at an evolu-
tionary pace .'Hamilton has indicated also theaiperiority, as an economic
stimulus, of gently rising to falling prices)a
LordKeynes suggested that Economic Historymight be rewritten from its
beginnjngs in terms of the stimulating effects of Inflationand the con-
strictive influence of deflation; that it might be shownhow Sumeria and- 84 -
Egypt and the lands on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf drew stimulus
from the iwnetarymetals of Arabia and hfrica; how the dispersal by
Alexander of the precious metal reserve of Persia caused that great out-
burst of economic progress in the Mediterranean, whose fruits ultimately
passed into the hands of Rome; how subsequent deflation destroyed Rome; how
medievalstagnation issued out of a deficiency in the supply of money in
use arid was dissolved by its increase; and how in moderntimescapitalism
and industrial progress were nourished by risingprices.43
According to Siiniand economic progress stems from the alternatingrise
and fall of prices in the shorter and in the longer runs.During the up-
swing many ventures get under way and factor pricesrise, but toward the
close of this phase productive efforts relax andproductivity falls.During
the subsequent phase prices decline with productprices falling more than
factor prices, cuts in which are resisted.Hence rationalization and
effort are intensified in order to bringproductivity into line with rela-
tively high factor prices and relativelylow product prices; as aresult
output per worker rises.Moreover, ratinnalizatiOnduring the falling
phase is facilitated by capital accumulatediring the rising phase.The
technological factor therefore ispassive in character Just as aredivision
of labor and population growth; forwhile they are sourcesof economic
progress, they actually are adoptedonly under thestimulus of price move-
ments It, follows that there can beeconomic progressonly in a money
economy and then only if moneyflows to the econOmY,from gold mines and
agencies supplying paper money, insuch mannrr as to preservealternating
price movements.447proportion in Growth
Endurance of increase in magnitude probably presupposes that growth be not
at too rapid a rate to permit integral incorporation of thenewincrements
into the g'ow1ng unit,andthat the relative homogeneity of the growing unit
not be undermined by a too great differentiation of its parts resulting from
unbalanced growth.The history of the growth of both national states and
business firms will supply examples of nonendurance of growth for either of
these reasons.And the history of the growth of societies and their subdi'
visions will probably reveal that there is order in growth, great deviation
from which is to the disadvantage of the growing unit.
That an orderly principle of organization underlies growth intime and
space is suggested by G. K. Zipf's findings respectingwhat he calls the
"hypothesis of the ininimwn eciation" according to which"work is always
minimized inhuman behavior".According to this equation
"the sum of the products of all masses moved, whenmultiplied by
their 'work distances' (as defined) will be aminimum....On the
basis of this analogue ["in which certainassumptions were made")
we deduced some equations aboutthe number, relative sizes,.and
spacings of the communities, as well as aboutthe number and di..
versity of their manufacturing, distributing,and other activity,.
including the number and lengths of tripsand other movements
within the system."45
Zipf's studysuggests that the endurance ofgrowthandof societies subject
to growth is conditioned by their rate of growth,by the extent towhich
the comparative growth of the components ofthe growing unitremains in
balance, and in general by the degree towhich the growth ofthe growing
unit corresponds to known and necessarypatterns of growthin time and
8pace.
8 Theories of wth-tage8
The nineteenth century witnessed the
formulation of thetheory that aneconomypa$3e8through a sequence of growth-stages, and sometimes the draw-
jpg of t.inference that the rate at which an economy proceeds through
these growihstages may be stepped up by state - or some other form of
collejtive intervention.This type of theory had been anticipated, of
courie, b5 a vriety of writers(e.g., Petty, Turgot, Condorcet,
S!4nt-Sinwn, Comte).It was treated at some length by a number of histori-
cal economists in the last century (e.g., F. L&st, Hildebrand, Schmoller,
Bcher, E1y).It has been made use of in the UnitedStatesparticularly by
N. S. B. Gras, who conceives of aneconomic societyaspassing typically
through five successive socio-economic stages:collectional; cultural
noindic; village; town; and metropolitan.Vhile the various stage theories
are of some use in indicating in a summaryfashion the course of develop-
ment through which a society probably will pass inmoving from a primitive
toa imdern industrial level, they throwonly a limited measure oflight
upon the forces of growth.
In recent rears, several economists havesought to discover andplot
the course of growth which economies, particularlyWestern economies,have
traced during the past several centuries.Thus, according to
Waither Hoffman, the industriafly mostadvanced countries(e.g., Great
Britain, Germany, United States) haveproceeded through threestages.In
Stage I, consumer-goods industries(= Q)predominate overindustries (' )
which produce capital goods, the ratio ofto(measured in terms of out-
put) lying between 4:1 and 6:1.The dominance ofC in Stage I isattribut-
ablesometimes to the high develOPmentof the clothingindustry, and some-
times to the development of industriesthat produceother necessariesand
]uxuris.Sj,age i give place to stageU in consequenceof the fact thatthe capitalgOOdsindustries grow more rapidl3r than the consumer-goods
industries.The ratio oftoin Stage II economies lies between 25:1
and 1.5:1.In Stage II, as in Stage I economies, theonsuIner industx'ies
aredomina+.ed either by clothing industries or by industries that produce
other necessaries and luxuries.
'ien a country has passed into Stage Ltthe prodtiction of capital
goods tends to continue to grow more rapidly than that of consumer goods,
but the superiority of the rate of growth ofthe former over that of the
latter is much less pronounced than during the periodwhen the same country
was moving from Stage Iinto Stage II.Accordingly, in Stage Ill countries,
the ratio of C to K is somewhat, but notpronouncedly, lower than in Stage
II countries.This ratio lies between l.5t1 and 0,5:]..In Stage III
countries, the capital-goods industry isdominated, as a rule, by its iron,
metal-ware, machine, and chemical branches,
According to Cohn Clark, too, economies passthrough three stages.
In the first stage, employment ispredominantly primary in character,In
the second stage, employment in mahufactuiScomes to the foreIn the
third stage, employment in the servicesbecomes prominent.
The analyses of both Hoffmanand Clark suggest that areprO8efltatiVe
CCOflOffly, in developing from aprimitive to anadvanced level, tends to
traverse a predictable course through asequence ofcomparatively predict-
able and jndentifiable stages.This finding, ifvalid, is Of greatsignif I-
cance for cc*.intries in an earlyphase of industrialdeve1orfleflt; for it
suggests into what channels it ispreferable that laborand capital be
directed if a country's economy is toprogresssatisfactOrilY'This find-
ing, therefore, ha8 commanded theinterest of thosewhose concernis-
I
acceleration of theindustrialization of countries that are comparatively
preindustrial in characterePresumably, as W. Leontief's input,-outpit
approach is developed and given more of a time-dimension, it willbe used
to improve theapplication of the cruder findings of Hoffman and Clnrk.
Analysis of family budgets, classified by amount of income andstand-
ardized for size of family, suggeststhat as family income rises, the con-
sumption and employment structures of economieswill change along the
general lines indicated by the studiesof Clark and Hoffman.A similar
conclusion is suggested by tudies of thechanges of family budgets and
consumption patterns through time.Evidently, therefore, a theoretical
basis, founded upon the behaviorof individual and/or familial,and
governmental-unit consumers, can be providedfor evolutionarytendencies
of the sort discovered by Hoffmanand Clark.Such a theory, of course,
must assume a high degree of consumersovereignty endfreedom.46
9 Changes in Culture or in CulturalConfigurations.
Of all the theories or explanationsof the course ofgrowth of societies,
that which runs in terms ofculture (broadlydefiid) or of cultural con-
figuration is logically the mostadequate albeit themost difficult to
formulate effectively.This approach hasbeen developedprinCiPallY by
sociologist and anthropologiststudents of culture.As a rule,economists,
because of their manner ofdefining the scopeof economics,have eschewed
this approach.partial exceptions areto be found,however, inwriters
such as Veblen with hiseiaphasis upon theprimary importanceof the materi-
al or technological base ofsociety, Max Weberand W. Sombartwith their
emphases upon the spiritual orsubjective aspectsof economicsystems,
Durkheim with his awareness ofthe socialaspects ofdivieiOD of labor,
Parto with his reognitioflthat an adequateeXplaflati01 ofsocietal-89-
veloprrent must be much more inclusive than the purely economic, and in
solnO degreethose followers of Marx who are alert to the role of non-
economiC factors.
A cultural theory of growth seeks its explanation within the culture
itself, attaching relatively little weight to the purely material environ-
ment vthich (withinlimits) is or can be given shape by the culture.A
culturaltheory may be morphological in character as is 0, Spengler's,47
according to which every culture, having risen and become a distinct and
integrated unity of the aspects of life of the population producing and
bearing it, flourishes and then declines.This type of theory offers no
more than insights into the processes of growthand decay.Again a theory
may be essentially empirical as is that of A.L.Kroeber48 who shares some
but not all of Spengler's views and vkio rejects the conclusionthat cultures
are individual entities (like higherorganisms), necessarily subject to a
regular and cyclical path of behavior, and doomed todie after having once
flourished.Kroeber found evidence of temporaryoutbursts of aesthetic and
intellectual erxeavors in all the higher civilizationshe examined.(He
made no analysis of economic data, he reports,because it was not bebe had
in sufficient quantity.)Cultural patterns becomedifferentiated, selective,
andspecialized, and tend to develop incertain directionsuntil the attain-
able limits of this developuent have beenreached; then thereusually ensues
a stationary state of growth, or a lullduring which theculture Is recon-
Btituted preparatory to further growth.whether "a wholeculture can die of
itself through internal causes or inherentaging" Kroeber doesnot say, for
he constes the death of a particular culture
(or form ofculture) to be its
replacement byme other.His data andanalysiS suggest,however, that the
type of culture most likely to give placeto otherswithout materially90 -
altering their content is a small one when exposed to the continuous impact
of a large one.
The most extensively developed of the cultural theories is that of
P. A.Sorokin.49It is not enough to ixxlicate that human culture is the sum
total of everything created or modified by interacting individuals.It is
necessary to discover the cement that holds the isolated components of a
lture together, after these have been selected arshaped so that they can
coexist.This cement Sorokin calls "1ogicomeaningfulnes&'.In other
words, the elements that make up a culture do not constitute anintegrated
whole until they have been bound together and made comprehensibleby "a
central meaning, idea, or mental bias" that permeates allthe components,
gives sense and significance to each of them, and in this waymakes cosmos
of a chaos of unintegrated fragments.Integrated cultural systems are tobe
distinguished, therefore, In terms of their majorpremises, that is, their
basic conceptions of the nature of reality, thenature of the needs and ends
to be satisfied, the extent to which they are tobe satisfied, and the
methods of satisfaction employable.
any possible systems ofintegrated culture areconceivable, yet be-
cause of limitations inherent incultural change they havenot developed.
The actual systemsthatman has evolvedhave been eitherpredominantlY
Sensate (with stress upon immediatelysensiblereality,carnal needs, and
adjustment of environment toindividual), or predominantlYIdeatiofla(with
stress upon transmaterial reality,spiritual need, andadjustment of indivi-
dual to environment), or Idealist(which is a balancedsynthesis of the
t*) preceding types).Moreover, whilecultural systemsinevitably change
through time, the pathways of c1anga havebeen restricted,the process of- 91 -
cultw'al change having slowly swung man back and forth between the purely
Sensate and thepurely Ideational poles.By means of indices relating to
selected and necessarily coexisting cultural components (e.g., art forms,
system8 of knowledge and truth, ethical values, relationships among mdi-
viduals, classes, andpeoples) Sorokin traces the super-rhythm of soclo-
cultural change through the inevitable order of phases:Ideational,
Idealistic, Sensate, Ideational, etc.In ancient times culture changed
from the Ideational through theIdealistic to the Sensate phase which pre-
vailed In the closing centuries of Graeco-Romandomination; this last phase
wasfollowedsuccessively by the Ideational, theIdealisticand, in the
fourteenth century, the Sensate This Sensate phase, now overripe,will
give way again to an Ideational phase.
The source of change is immanent in theculture.(Sorokin calls it the
"principle of immanent self-determinationof the system' sdestinytt)
AlthoxgJi the course of changeis circumscribed by limitsinherent in a
culture at given times, there isconsiderable room forvariation in the
unfolding of the potentialitiesimmanent in the culturalsystem and in the
changing of the milieu of thecultural system itself.
Sorokin's analysis suggests,not a rise andfall of cultures intheir
economic and other aspects, but asupersessiOflf one phase bythe next.
Sorokin finds long economic wavesto be associated,but not closely,with
the rise and declineofthe main types ofculture.Economic conditions,
judged by contemporary Sensatestandards, tend tobe lover inIdeational
than in Sensate cultures; they improveas thecultUre swingsfrom the
Ideational to the Sensate phase,
reaching a highpeak under theIdealistic
and a maximum level wider the&nsate justbefore it beginsto decline aridwith it theeconomic level..The Sensate culture apparently tends to gener-
ate forces thatundermine economic welfare whe reas the Ideational, though
essentially disdainful of economic well-being, may generate forces that
improve theeconomic situation and prepare the way for its subsequent
flourish.With respect to economic organization Sorokin finds long swings
between totalitarianism andlaissez-faireism, but not a perpetual trend in
either direction, with8WiflgStoward totalitarianism fostered by increases
in economic inequality andadverseness of economic conditions.50
Unlike Sorokin some exponents ofiltural change assume that signifi-
cant change usually (oralways) manifests jtslf initially in the technolo-
gical or material basis of a culture and thenImposesuponother components
of the culture the necessity ofadaptation.Maclver's analysis reveals the
weakness othis approach.He divides being into threedynamic reams, the
physical, the organic, and the conscious;and theconsciousrealm into three
orders, the culturai (having to do withvalue configurations), thetechno-
logical (which includes basic technology,together with theeconomic and
political systems which organizetechnology), and the social(which consists
in the 'web of relationships that embraceIndividuals andgroups). Ills
analysis further suggests thatalthough the orders ofconscious being are
somewhat interdependent, thisinterdependence isquite loose in many re-
spects.Thus with the sametechnological base, widelyvarying political
and economic systems may be associated.Ingeneral his analysis seemsto
suggest that the primary locus ofcultural change isthc value-System
found inthe cultural order, andthat institutionalchange issuesout of
thestriving ofmen to realizevaes insituationsimperfectlYequilibrated
by institutions51- 93 -
The upshot of the Cultural theorie s seems to be two-fold with respect
to the economicrise and fail of societies.(1) A high rate of economic
growth can be realized in societies with differing cultures provided that
the regnant value systems stress material ends and technological progt'esss
(2) A high rate of economic growth presupposes compatibility between the
economic and the non-economic components of a cultural system.Incoinpati-
bility, on the contrary, makes for a falling off in the rate of growth.
The cultural approach suggests also that cultural change isaccompanied not
so much by the rise orfall of a society as by the supersession of one
cultural form by another; and that, therefore, the measurement of rise
and/or fall presupposes an arbitrary standard of measurement such as
outlined in Section II.
10 Miscellaneous Determinants of Growth.
In Section II a list of the determinants of percapita net product was pre-
sented.Not all of these have been treated by theauthors under review,
nor is it possThle amply to considerthem hereThe rise and fall of
societies is affected, or is said to beaffected, by a number of factors
which may just be noted here.
(a) Population growth.Population growth is oftentreated as if it is
an essentially independent variable uponwhose movement thegrowth of an
economy largely depends.If growth is definedin terms of ( see Section
II above), it follows that there is a high
degree52 of dependence of growth
upon the movement of population.A more fundamentalanaLysis indicates,
however, that population and populationgrowth areessentially resultants
ofpa8tand present value syst1sand levels ofeconomic activity(for upon
thtse gross reproduction largelydepends) and of thedeterminants Of
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mortality.while a change in the population variable may affect economic
variables which in turn after a time influence the population variable,53
ttie initial sourceof the change is predominantly nondemographic in charac-
ter.Change8 in the population variable are of use to students of growth
principallY as indicators of more fundamental changes in the subjective
arid/or the objective apparatus of thesociety.54
It should be noted also that, because of changes in the structure of
populations, a population unit may respond differentlytoday than in the
past to conditions affecting mortality or natality.Prior to the nineteenth
century all populations resembled in structurethose of the Orient today and
those of earlier centuries.Mortality and natality were high, and popula-
tions failed to grow only when mortalitybalanced or rose above natality
which, by niodarn standards, was relativelyhigh.With improvements in
medicine and the gradual introduction ofeffective contraceptive methods,
natality fell, but for long not so rapidly asmortality.Hence population
grew with unusual rapidity in manycountries until natality hadmoved to a
relatively low level,In the Ve stern ?Jorld,therefore, population has
undergone five types of evolution.(i) The rate of populationgrowth,
formerly high, has descended in theneighborhood of the zerolevel, and
probably will remain here even thoughmortality should fallscynewhat more.
(2) In consequence of (1), the capacity ofwestern countriesto provide
emigrants has alaost disappeared.(3) In consequenceof the declinein
mortality and natality, the agestructure of esternpopulations has
changed from an Oriental type to what maybe called awestern type.
(4)Because of the decline in thesize and thenet reproductionof farm
populations, their capacity to provideurban recruits,while stillpoitiV6,- 95 -
has becomerelatively low.(5) Fertility differentialswithin populations
which were accentuated by the introduction of contraception are gradually
disappearing as the practice of contraception spreads.Oriental popula-
tions, by contrast, still face these five types of demographic evolution.
It may be added also that, because conception can be effectively controlled,
natality may be more sensitive to fluctuations in the level of family
income than in the past.
Civil order.Civil order is primarily a resultant issuing out of
the relative homogeneity of a society's culture and value-system and the
willingness and capacity of the ruling class or the strategically situated
classes to use force if necessary; it also has some of the earmarks of an
irependent social variable,In modern societies civil order tends to pre-
vail except in periods when the power structures that fixdominator-subject
relations are giving place to new powerstructures.55
Civil order is a precondi.on of economic growthwhich presupposes an
absence of great uncertainty regarding the content andenforcement of the
rules regulating interpersonal intercourse.In fact, even the quasi-
disorder presently being produced by the jjinoderatedemands of large eco-
nomic pressure groups is unfavorable to economicgrowth and, if intensified,
will have to be settled by force and in a mannercalculated to bring an
effective power-structure intobe1ng.6 Both the source of civildisorder
and its specific relation to the level of economicactivity reouire the
attention of studcnte of societal growth.
War.War acts directly andir1irectly to influencethe growth
indices of societies.While some of theseindices arelittle affected,
others have their continuity broken by war..In extreme cases,as Toynbee-96-
shews, militarismeventually brings about the destruction of a society.
ai. mayprepare the way for a redistribution of power within a society, or
for areorganization of its activities.Thus E. Halevy observed prior to
World War II that it wasfrom the state administration of World Var I "far
more thanfrom karxist doctrine that all post-war socialin derives."57
While war usually issues out of somewhat known circumstances,it must also
be treated as somethingindependent of the culture of which those circum-
stances are a part, for war,if it gets under can produce unpredictable
changes in that culture.Perhaps the most fruitful research approach is
the discovery of reasons for thedifferential response of growthindices to
the impact ofwar.58
(d)Purelyecononiic determinants of growth.Inasmuch as this paper
purports to deal with the nreinclusive theories of societalgrowth, no
detailed attention is given to purelyeconomic governors of growth.Several
of these may be noted, however.Thus a high rate of economicgrowth pre-
supposes that investment andincome grow at a sufficientlyhigh rate, and
this In turn presupposes adequate actioneither by investors orby the
governuent or by bothtogether.59Again there is theproblem of developing
and industrializing underindu8trialcountriesIf factors ofproduction
1re perfectly mobile in the shorterand the longer runsthereuld be no
real problem.But this is not the caseThere is roughly onekind of
ecological growth through time suited tothe needs ofold and heavilypOpU-
lated countries such asIndia,60 and another andsomewhat differentkind of
ecological growth through time suitedto the needsof noW andless densely
populatedcountries suchas arefound In LatinP.inerica.JudiciouS use of
mich ecological patternsuld acceleratenational economiCgrowthin the
affected areas.
-Societal Laws of Growth Discoverable?
Exaintnat.ion of the works of historians indicates that almost without
exception they avoid giving expression to anything characterizable as a law
or even a somewhatrestrictednpirical generalization;61 theyare content
to say that SUCh and such assisted, or accounted for, such and such.For
this (quite proper) avoidance of generalization the basic approach of the
historian, together with the nature of his data, is responsible.The ob-.
jects of his study are unique and individual units with specific and de-
finite location in time and space62hi1e he assumes that particular
events appropriately associated in time are manifestationsof an underlying
process and are interconnected, he doesnot try to squeeze out time and
space and Infer that the same, or aquite similar, sequence of events will
recur.He does not assume that quite similar sequenceshave occurred or
may occur at other times and placesand that, consequently, a law orprin-
ciple can be formulated to describe such sequencein a generalizable manner.
It is because the historian approaches his subjectmatter as he usually
does, therefore, that he does not seek, as doscientists in other fields,
to discover patterns and uniformities inthe events manifestingthe process
of societal growth (or decay).
It is accepted in various quarters thatthe historian ofsocial pro-
cesses cannot discover principles withmuch predictivevalue.There is too
much that is essentially accidental in character.
The utmost that he can
do is to formulate "generalizations of quitelimited validity"relating to
the past.63 Even historians employing a Ilarxian
approach admit findingit
impossible to forecast the course ofeconomic developmentunder capitalism
because of the indeterminacy inherenttherein.For he cannotforetell the- 98 -
OCCUrrereof the creative responses and other circumstances on which de-
pend the emergenceof new itilustries and the consequent offsetting of the
supposed tendenoy ofthe organic composition of capital to rise and of eo'
nonic stagnation to setin.64History ha3 been compared in respect to
capacity to predict to geophysics(the physics of earthquakes, meteorology,
etc.) because lack of knowledge of the initial conditions (i.e., analogues
of position, velocities,and masses in physics), even when it has been
sufficiently overcome to permit the discovery of anhistorical 'law,
greatly restricts its use for purposes ofprediction.65It has been
asserted, moreover, that the frequency of divergentphenomena (i.e.,
phenomena such as individual action "where from aanall beginning increae'
ingly large effects areproduced") in human affairs greatly reduces the
predictability of the course of social processes.
Several difficulties beset the path of thestudent of the rise and
fall of societies.(1) It is impossible to select aself-contained unit
that is isolated from all other units(or that can safely be viewed asif
it were isolated from all otherunits) and can be treated as aclosed
system.Great care must be exercised,therefore, lest what isinternal in
origin is treated as external, or what isexternal is looked upon as
internal.
(2) The units that are selected forstudy (states,societies, civili-
zations, cultures, etc.) are not homogeneous,but differ ingreater or
lesser measure one from another.These differences areprimarily spatial
in selective origin when the units chosen forcomparison areof the same
time period, and temporal in selectiveorigin when theunits considered are
from different time periods.If the unitsselected for studywere
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absolUtelY homogeneous except for differences in age of unit where such
differences exist; andif the behavior of an individual unitwere not sub-
jectto any unpredictability arising from an uncertainty principle similar
to that which makesunpredictable the movement of an individual particle;
then a minute and detailed analysis of the course of growth of any particu-
lax' unit would disclose what internal behavioral acts are creative(i.e.,
generative of action or of novelty), what responses are adaptive (adjust-
nients either to creative acts or to adjustment-action issuing out of a
creativ! act), and how these various actions(or events) are sequentially
connected and revealing of underlying growth processes; andituld dis-
cover a rational law orprinciple of growth on the basis of which the
growth of any other unit of like age can be indIcated orpredicted.Be-
cause of the differences thatobtain anng units, howevtr, this kind of
approach to the discovery of principles ofsocietal growth is out of the
question,
(3) Since It is not possible toderive a general principle ofgrowth
from careful study of a single unittruly typical of a homogeneousworld
of such units, a comparative statisticalstudy of many unitsmust be under-
taken.This study can yieldreasonably satisfactoryresults, however, only
if the units selected for study aresufficiently similar.If, under these
circumstances satisfactory correlations areobtaird, they stillcannot
disclose an acceptable principle ofgrowth until it isshown that substan-
tially similar links bind togetherthe sequences ofrelevant events ineach
of the units studied.phether such linkagecansatisfactorily be estab-
lished is still open to question inviewf the actualdifference among
culture8,67Even if the anditions just indicated are met anda seemingly
satisfactorY principle of growth is established on the basis of a compara-
tive study of units not too unlike to disclose such a principle, a signifi-
cant contingency will still remain respecting the future applicability of
this principle.Will the correlations, the linkages, and the sequences stay
put through tiue; or will they change for reasons not implicit in and in-
ferable from the data?In the latter event, the derivation of a satisfac-
tory generalization capable of describing and predicting growth must await
the discovery of the principle of change affecting the nexus between events.
If as the societal system evolves, novel elements or novel rela-
tionships come into being in a measure (quantitativeand/or qualitative)
sufficiently great in relation to the elements and relationships that en-
dure, then the basis of the linkages underlying theobserved correlations
will be undermined and the supposed law of growth will haveto be reforinu-
lated.Since, as cultures do evolve, what we havecalled novelties
(elements and relationships not theretofore krwn) come intobeing, it is
probable that a final and unchanging principle ofsocietal growth can never
be formulated, that the empirical principles which areformulated will have
to brecast periodically if they are toremain useful.If the universe of
societies were characterized only by oyclicalbehavior, and notcontinually
disturbed by novelties, a satisfactory andpersisting empiricallaw of
growth probably could be formulated.
At present no satisfactory theory ofsocietal growth exists.Such a
pr.ncip1e can only be discovered gradually,originallY throughessentiallY
empirical research and ultimately throughthe discipliningof the empirical
findings by abstract theory.As a beginningtowardncoveriflg such a- 101 -
princiPle, the national state may be chosen as a unit, and a comparative
study may be madeof all states.Data, statistical and otherwise, usually
are reportedby state.States which resemble one another rather closely
may begrouped for some purposes of analysIs.In every case detailed
attention must be given to establishing linkages between relevant events
and çrocesses In each of the national units studied.-102-
It should benoted that neither4noris represented as an index of a
psychicmagnitude or aggregate.
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